Figure 1. Outcome Matrix of the Game of Esther and
In (x, y), x = Esther's payoff; y = Ahasuerus' payoff 4 = best; 3 = next best; 2 = next worst; 1 = worst regards. Of course, the trouble begins in the Garden of Eden. God sets out the rules of the game: eat anything but the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. And woman (and man) are immediately tempted and disobey. The trouble continues as God, through Moses, sets plague after plague on the Egyptians, even hardening the heart of Pharoah, so he will not give in "too soon." This state of affairs prompts considerable hand-wringing on Brams' partparticularly since game theory posits rational players and Brams is at pains to prove that God is rational. He argues reasonably enough that Man, having received free will from God, is free to disobey if he chooses. He is also forced to wonder whether God-no longer omnipotent once He grants free will-may also no longer be omniscient either, failing to foresee Adam and Eve's disobedience, or indeed the periodic restiveness of the Children of Israel. Brams, clearly disturbed by God's occasional "treachery" toward Man, finally concludes that "this inimical behavior stems principally from His overweening concern for His reputation." Perhaps anachronistically thinking about His "image," writes Brams, "God continually broods about it. He worries endlessly about how to enhance it. He is not so much concerned with the world as how He thinks the world sees Him. He is other-directed with a vengeance" (173, 175). It may be that in large measure Brams has difficulty with God and other biblical personages simply because the text he has chosen to analyse is, precisely, the Bible-a reputedly infallible, certainly sacred book. Although the Bible is more terse than many literary texts concerning the motivation of its personages, the veneration in which it is held by the faithful, its possibly overwhelming prestige suggests that its decisions must necessarily be the "rational" ones posited by game theory. Any game-theory exegete is thus required, sometimes, to reason mightily about the slim biblical evidence while working diligently to justify biblical personages and most especially, of course, God.
Actually, Brams' very remarkably formulated and powerful method may be easier to apply to texts with less awesome implications and more explicit information on motivation. Moreover, just as Brams believes that some biblical sto-ries lend themselves better than others to game-theory analysis, one might suppose that some literary domains, some genres, some epochs may also lend themselves better than others to analysis of this type. As a student of French literature reading Brams for the first time, I thought of a number of domains influenced by one or another formalism: the Grands Rhetoriqueurs, or the blasons, or the classicist plays of the Grand Siecle, or the piece bienfaite of the later nineteenth century, or the conte of the same period, or indeed the French New Novel. Each of these had previously struck me and others as functioning like one or another kind of puzzle-almost as a kind of casier or game board of possibilities, each one of which must be visited in the working out of any such "well-written" work.
The possibilities are numerous and can certainly not be exhausted in any one article, or series of articles, or books. In the following pages however I will sketch application of certain game-theory concepts to three examples: Corneille's Le Cid, a conte by Maupassant dering of preferences in his famous monologue at the end of Act One clearly gives him, in the game-theory term, a "dominant" strategy, i.e., a strategy avoiding the worst result (and possibly giving the best result) whatever may be done by the other player. Rodrigue's dominant strategy, of course, is to prefer duty to love, whatever Chimene's response may be, since this is the only strategy rendering him worthy of her continuing love and esteem. Chimene's strategic options, moreover, are entirely symmetrical with Rodrigue's, as she points out herself in the third act: As modeled in Figure 2 , the Game of Rodrigue and Chimene becomes an example of a favorite, indeed fundamental problem of game theory, the Game of Prisoner's Dilemma. In a sense "invented" to serve the theoretical needs of game theory by A. W. Tucker, the Game of Prisoner's Dilemma posits that two criminals, accomplices in crime, are arrested and held without possibility of communicating with each other. Each criminal knows that if both remain silent, their individual and collective punishment will be relatively slight. However, each criminal also knows that if he informs on his accomplice his personal punishment will be diminished, and that conversely, if his accomplice confesses, his own punishment will be increased. The issues of "honor among thieves" and individual versus collective optimum solutions raised by the Game of Prisoner's Dilemma have made it a classic game-theory problem. 6 In the case of Rodrigue and Chimene, if each player plays "rationally" according to the matrix in Figure 2 , Rodrigue will avoid the worst by accepting an adversarial role; Chimene will avoid the worst by choosing murder over legal means. But if each player chooses these "rational" strategies-rational according to time-honored notions of game theory-each will fail to achieve the As they try to avoid the Prussian patrols, the two friends play a game "against nature"-more specifically, in this case, a game against the Prussians. The major factor is simply whatever random chance there may be that the Prussians will find them: a situation presenting little gametheoretic interest in the spare form presented in the story. After the Prussians do find them, however, the two friends find themselves playing an unpleasant game with the Prussian officer. He announces he will shoot them as spies unless they reveal the French password. They remain silent. The Prussian officer then takes Monsieur Morissot aside individually and asks again for the password, promising not to let the other know if he cooperates. When Monsieur Morissot still refuses, the officer makes the same offer to Monsieur Sauvage, who likewise remains silent. And, true to his word, the officer has them shot.
For Greimas, the Prussian's proposition represents the circulation of an object of value: the password. Greimas comes close to the game-theory distinction between payoffs and utilities when he remarks that "un objet quelconque peut etre institue en objet de vouloir" ["any object may be considered an object of desire "] either for its own sake or because "sa possession peut etre consideree comme souhaitable ou necessaire en vue de la realisation d'un autre PN pro-jete" ["its possession may be considered desirable or necessary with a view to realizing another projected narrative program"] (192). For Greimas the officer's proposition is a "structure d'echange" ["a structure of exchange"], but one whose supposedly attractive aspects are actually an invitation to live a lie and a reminder of the unequal power relationship. The apparent exchange offer is actually a dilemma and an ultimatum. Greimas comes close to game theory again when he writes that the two friends' choice is a "decision qui est un exercise de /pouvoir-faire/ situe sur la dimension cognitive" ["decision which is an exercise of the being-able-to-do on the cognitive dimension"] (200). The officer's proposition tries to place the two friends in a position of being-unablenot-to-choose. However, because this choice is unattractive, "la negation de ce terme a pour resultat l'emergence de son terme contradictoire [sur le corre semiotique], du /pouvoir ne pas faire/" ["the negation of this term has as its result the emergence of its contradictory term (in the semiotic table), that of being-able-not-to-do"] (207). The two friends do not divulge the password, and they are executed. Greimas does not use the word "game" in his analysis of this section of the story. He does observe, however, that "le veritable enjeu" is not giving or not giving the password, but the unequal power relationship itself. The decision is influenced in another way by a sender, the water that represents the liberty of the two fishing friends, and an anti-sender, the nearby artillery fire, a reminder of death. In the end the republican Sauvage and the anarchist Morissot do not divulge the password and are executed. 8 Meanwhile, a student of game theory might model the Game of the Two Friends and the Prussian Officer in a variety of ways, depending on his assumptions. The officer, of course, presents it as a very simple zero-sum game: talk and go free or be silent and be shot. A more complex model reveals more about the situation, however. Presumably, the two friends' first preference is to remain silent and nevertheless go free. This would have been the case if they had avoided capture, but that can happen now only if the Prussian changes his mind. In any case, as a first preference, it would have a value of four. As to their next preference, their earlier cynical comments about wars and governments suggest that they might prefer survival to patriotism. However, Monsieur Sauvage's other earlier comment that the Prussians are worse than beasts-perhaps confirmed by the final outcome-suggests that when the chips are down those two friends might prefer death to helping the enemy (3). If for some reason they did have to reveal the password, presumably they would prefer to go free (2). Surely, their worst alternative would be to reveal their secret only to be shot anyway (1).
This last consideration raises the question of the Prussian officer's sincerity, or in game-theoretical terms, of his corresponding strategic choices. One might argue that given the reputed bestiality of the Prussians, the officer's first preference might be to learn the password and shoot the two friends anyway, possibly in order to prevent them from warning the French forces (4). This possibility does not at all seem to be suggested by the text, however. One might also argue plausibly that the Prussian, mindful of his honor as an officer, might prefer to learn the password and then keep his bargain (4? 3? ). In any case, he would presumably prefer to maintain credibility by shooting them if they do not talk (2). His worst alternative would be to let them remain silent and then free them anyway (1).
Since the two friends "play" first, their game may be represented appropriately as a 2 x 4 game matrix (Figure 3). Figure 3 reveals that, as it The Greimasian analysis sees the two friends as subject to forces exterior to themselves: they react against the superior force of the Prussian officer; they are influenced by the sender and anti-sender; their negation of the Prussian's unattractive offer leads to the "emergence of its contradictory term" in the semiotic table. In contrast, game theory subsumes these considerations in the ordering of players' utilities. It sees these players not as buffeted by fortune but as rational decision-makers in a specific situation. That situation, however, is that very specially-structured one embodied in the Game of the Prussian Officer: the precise context within which the players' decisions become rational. An example of this is the possibly puzzling but game-theory rational reaction of each friend as he plays the Game of the Prussian Officer separately, or indeed the reactions of the two friends together as they apparently defy overwhelming power, but also simply play the best (dominant) strategy available to them as they "make the best of a bad bargain. What might game theory add to this? The game M and X play for the possession of A is, like Nim, a simple zero-sum game. The game X plays with A to persuade her to leave with him is more complex, but presumably one in which X has a dominant strategy. X has, so to speak, "nothing to lose." As for the Marienbad Game, the minimax theorem has already shown that its determinate character is not unusual. Morrissette's appendix has already shown that the Marienbad Game's value for the rational player moving first is -1: a loss. However, these facts throw an odd light on what Morrissette sees as the "power" of M's play, his ability to profit from the "surrounding ignorance" of the game. M, of course, could have chosen any one of a number of Nim variants whose value for the first player would be + 1: a win. He could have chosen to play some game of another order whose determinate nature would be not necessarily guaranteed by the minimax or by game-theory attempts to extend the minimax to other classes of games. Instead, M has chosen to play a game whose minimax value for him is negative (he moves first in two out of three games in the printed version). Whatever M's ability to bluff, he has chosen a game in which the cards "are stacked against him."
In the printed text, M's "system" serves him perfectly: he wins all his matches against X. In the film version, as Morrissette points out, X wins a final match with M, foreshadowing his eventual "victory" with A. Morrissette asks, "is it deliberately?" In game theory terms, however, this question is inappropriate. M has not entered an equal contest, winning at first but losing later. In game theory terms, M has chosen to play a game at which any rational player-or any player who becomes rational as he learns the game-system-can beat him. In the reality of game theory and as an "interior duplication" Actually, however, this difference may not be exactly what it first appears. Sauvage and Morissot, Rodrigue and Chimene are rational in game-theory terms, but only in the special context of the rather unusual and, perhaps, contrived games they play. However natural and pertinent the two friends' dilemma of survival and resistance to oppression may appear to readers of "Les Deux Amis," a great many stories by Maupassant and others show little or no interest in such topics. Obviously, the "name of the game" elsewhere is different. Similarly, generations of students have accepted as reasonable and natural Rodrigue and Chimene's preoccupation with love and duty. Yet while this issue is significantly widespread in seventeenth-century literature, as I have suggested elsewhere, numerous other Grand Siecle texts pay it little attention. In this way, presumably, the game-structure of literary texts may reproduce something like the "deep structure" of the semiotic square.'1 As things stand now, game-theory literary analysis is essentially undeveloped, particularly in comparison with competing methods. If it develops further, it may be because of one possibly significant advantage. While narrative semiotics is surely, at least in the current state of things, a more powerful and more widely applicable method, it does possess one attribute often said to be undesirable in "scientific" explanation; it has been accused of being dispiritingly complex, complicated, even obfuscatory. It is not simple. One of the ad-vantages of game theory, at least in this elementary stage, is its relative simplicity. Under some such inspiration Brams refers to the theory-of-science notion that "A good theory should be... relatively simple and easy to apply." For Brams, therefore, "this formalism, simple as it is, both summarizes a good deal in a story and highlights the central strategic choices of characters" (169). In the present article I have suggested (1) that Brams' conceptual repertoire can profitably be extended, (2) that literary domains not studied by Brams may provide more satisfying results, essentially because of differences in their own particular literary rationale, and (3) that game-theory analysis illuminates comparative narrative analyses of other, more powerful or more complicated kinds.
University of Illinois NOTES

